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Monday, July 26, 2010

Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean


Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs


Trafficking in persons (TIP) for the purpose of exploitation is a lucrative criminal activity that is of major concern to the United States and the international community. According to the most recent U.S. State Department estimates, roughly 800,000 people are trafficked across borders each year. If trafficking within countries is included in the total world figures, official U.S. estimates are that some 2 to 4 million people are trafficked annually. While most trafficking victims still appear to originate from South and Southeast Asia or the former Soviet Union, human trafficking is also a growing problem in Latin America. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has estimated that sex trafficking in Latin America generates some $16 billion worth of business annually.

Countries in Latin America serve as source, transit, and destination countries for trafficking victims. Latin America is a primary source region for people trafficked to the United States. As many as 17,500 are trafficked into the United States each year, according to State Department estimates. In FY2009, primary countries of origin for the 333 foreign trafficking victims certified as eligible to receive U.S. assistance included: Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (along with India, the Philippines, and Thailand).

Since enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106- 386), successive Administrations and Congress have taken steps to address human trafficking. In December 2008, the 110th Congress passed The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457). The Act, among other provisions, authorized TIP appropriations for FY2008 through FY2011. Obligations for U.S.-funded anti-TIP programs in Latin America totaled roughly $17.3 million in FY2009, up from $13.7 million in FY2008.

On June 14, 2010, the State Department issued its tenth annual, congressionally mandated report on human trafficking. In addition to outlining major trends and ongoing challenges in combating TIP, the report categorizes countries into four "tiers" according to the government's efforts to combat trafficking. Those countries that do not cooperate in the fight against trafficking (Tier 3) have been made subject to U.S. foreign assistance sanctions. While Cuba and the Dominican Republic are the only Latin American country ranked on Tier 3 in this year's TIP report, nine other countries in the region — Barbados, Belize, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela — are on the Tier 2 Watch List. Unless those countries make significant progress in the next six months, they could receive a Tier 3 ranking in the 2010 report.

The 111th Congress may continue to exercise its oversight of TIP programs and operations, including U.S.-funded programs in Latin America. Congress may consider increasing funding for anti-TIP programs in the region, possibly through the Mérida Initiative, or through other assistance programs. Congress may also monitor new trends in human trafficking in the region, such as the increasing involvement of Mexican drug trafficking organizations in TIP and the problem of child trafficking in Haiti, which has worsened since that country experienced a devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. Another issue of interest may be whether sufficient efforts are being applied to address all forms of TIP in Latin America, including not only sexual exploitation, but also forced labor. For more general information on human trafficking, see CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress, by Liana Sun Wyler and Alison Siskin.



Date of Report: July 13, 2010
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: RL33200
Price: $29.95

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Friday, July 23, 2010

Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances


Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component in U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba's communist government since the early 1960s. Under the George W. Bush Administration, restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic coursework. In June 2004, the Administration further restricted family and educational travel, eliminated the category of fully-hosted travel, and restricted remittances so that they could only be sent to the remitter's immediate family. Initially there was mixed reaction to the Administration's June 2004 tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions, but opposition to the policy grew, especially within the Cuban American community regarding the restrictions on family travel and remittances.

Dating back to 2000, there have been numerous legislative efforts to ease restrictions on travel to Cuba in various ways. The Bush Administration regularly threatened to veto legislation if it contained provisions weakening Cuba sanctions. In the 110th Congress, several House and Senate committee versions of appropriations bills had provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba, but no final action was taken before the end of the Congress.

During the 2008 electoral campaign, Barack Obama pledged to lift restrictions on family travel to Cuba as well as restrictions on Cuban Americans sending remittances to Cuba. In the aftermath of that election, the 111th Congress took action to ease some restrictions on travel to Cuba by including two provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8), which President Obama signed into law on March 11, 2009. The first provision eased restrictions on family travel, which the Treasury Department implemented by issuing a general license for such travel as it existed prior to the Bush Administration's tightening of family travel restrictions in June 2004. The second provision eased travel restrictions related to the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba, and required the Treasury Department to issue a general license for such travel. In April 2009, President Barack Obama announced that his Administration would go further and allow unlimited family travel and remittances. Regulations implementing these changes were issued in September 2009. The new regulations also included the authorization of general licenses for travel transactions for telecommunications-related sales and for attendance at professional meetings for commercial telecommunications transactions.

Several legislative initiatives have been introduced in the 111th Congress that would further ease Cuba travel restrictions: H.R. 874 (Delahunt)/S. 428 (Dorgan) and H.R. 1528 (Rangel) would prohibit restrictions on travel to Cuba; H.R. 188 (Serrano), H.R. 1530 (Rangel), and H.R. 2272 (Rush), which would lift the overall embargo on Cuba, would also lift travel restrictions; H.R. 1531 (Rangel)/S. 1089 (Baucus) and H.R. 4645 (Peterson)/S. 3112 (Klobuchar), which would facilitate the export of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, would also prohibit Cuba travel restrictions; H.R. 332 (Lee) would ease restrictions on educational travel; S. 774 (Dorgan), H.R. 1918 (Flake), and S. 1517 (Murkowski) would allow for travel related to hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities. In contrast, H.Con.Res. 132 (Tiahrt) would call for the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions before the United States increases trade and tourism to Cuba.

For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress.



Date of Report: June 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 33
Order Number: RL31139
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Thursday, July 22, 2010

Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements


M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Mexico has had a growing commitment to trade integration through the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) since the 1990s and its trade policy is among the most open in the world. Mexico's pursuit of FTAs with other countries not only provides economic benefits, but could also potentially reduce its economic dependence on the United States. The United States is, by far, Mexico's most significant trading partner. About 80% of Mexico's exports go to the United States and 49% of Mexico's imports come from the United States. Mexico's second largest trading partner is China, accounting for approximately 6% of Mexico's exports and imports. In an effort to increase trade with other countries, Mexico has a total of 11 trade agreements involving 41 countries. These include agreements with most countries in the Western Hemisphere including the United States and Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In addition, Mexico has negotiated FTAs outside of the Western Hemisphere and entered into agreements with Israel and the European Union in July 2000. Mexico also has an FTA with Japan.

Economic motivations are generally the major driving force for the formation of free trade agreements among countries, but there are other reasons countries enter into FTAs, including political and security factors. One of Mexico's primary motivations for the unilateral trade liberalization efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s was to improve economic conditions in the country, which policymakers hoped would lead to greater investor confidence and attract more foreign investment. Trade agreements are also expected to improve investor confidence, attract foreign investment, and create jobs. Mexico may have other reasons for entering into FTAs, such as expanding market access and decreasing its reliance on the United States as an export market. The slow progress in multilateral negotiations may also contribute to the increasing interest throughout the world in regional trade blocs. Some countries may see smaller trade arrangements as "building blocks" for multilateral agreements.

Since Mexico began trade liberalization in the early 1990s, its trade with the world has risen rapidly, with exports increasing more rapidly than imports. Mexico's trade balance with all countries went from a deficit of $13.5 billion in 1993 to surpluses of $7.1 billion in 1995 and $6.5 billion in 1996. Since 1998, Mexico's trade balance has remained in deficit, reaching $17.5 billion in 2008 and then declining to $4.8 billion in 2009. The trade balance with the United States went from a deficit of $2.4 billion in 1993 to a surplus of $72.5 billion in 2009. Exports to the United States increased from $42.9 billion in 1993 to $234.6 billion in 2008, and then declined to $184.9 billion in 2009. Mexico's imports from the United States increased from $45.3 billion in 1993 to $152.6 billion in 2008, and then declined to $112.4 billion in 2009 due to the economic downturn.

In the 111th Congress, issues of concern related to the trade and economic relationship with Mexico involve mostly economic conditions in Mexico, issues related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the effect of NAFTA, economic conditions in Mexico and Mexican migrant workers in the United States. This report provides an overview of Mexico's free trade agreements, its motivations for trade liberalization and entering into free trade agreements, and some of the issues Mexico faces in addressing its economic challenges
.


Date of Report: July 12, 2010
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: R40784
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Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress


Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Cuba remains a hard-line communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country's political succession from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Fidel stepped down from power in July 2006 because of health reasons, and Raúl assumed provisional control of the government until February 2008 when he officially became president. His government has implemented limited economic policy changes, but there has been disappointment that further reforms have not been forthcoming. The economy was hard hit by storms in 2008, and the global financial crisis caused further strains. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, although it did agree in July 2010 to release 52 political prisoners after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church.

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations, U.S.-sponsored broadcasting to Cuba, and support for human rights activists. In light of Fidel Castro's departure as head of government, many observers have called for a re-examination of sanctions policy. In this new context, two broad approaches have been advanced: an approach that would maintain the dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at changing attitudes in the Cuban government and society through increased engagement. The Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on family travel and remittances; eased restrictions on telecommunications links with Cuba; and restarted semi-annual migration talks. In 2010, the Administration strongly criticized the government's repression of dissidents and human rights activists, including the death of a hunger striker in February 2010, while it welcomed Cuba's July 2010 announcement of a prisoner release as a positive sign. The Administration has also called for the release of a U.S. government subcontractor imprisoned in Cuba since December 2009.

The 111th Congress approved three provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) in March 2009 that eased sanctions on family travel, travel for the marketing of agricultural and medical goods, and payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports. In December 2009, Congress included a provision in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations legislation (P.L. 111- 117) that eased payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2010 by defining the term "payment of cash in advance," and also continued funding for Cuba democracy programs and Radio and TV Martí broadcasting. In May 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 149, related to freedom of the press, while in March 2010 it approved S.Con.Res. 54, recognizing the life of a Cuban hunger striker.

Numerous initiatives have been introduced that would ease sanctions: H.R. 188, H.R. 1530, and H.R. 2272 (overall sanctions); H.R. 874/S. 428 and H.R. 1528 (travel); H.R. 332 (educational travel); H.R. 1531/S. 1089 and H.R. 4645/S. 3112 (agricultural exports and travel); H.R. 1737 (agricultural exports); and S. 774, H.R. 1918, and S. 1517 (hydrocarbon resources). H.R. 1103/S. 1234 would modify a trademark sanctions, while several bills cited above would repeal the sanction. S. 1808 would eliminate Radio and TV Martí. Measures that would increase sanctions are H.R. 2005 (related to fugitives), H.R. 2687 (OAS participation), and H.R. 5620 (Cuba's oil development). H.Con.Res. 132 calls for the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions before the United States increases trade and tourism to Cuba. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.



Date of Report: July 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 80
Order Number: R40193
Price: $29.95

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Tuesday, July 20, 2010

Jamaica: Background and U.S. Relations


Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs


The Caribbean island-nation of Jamaica has had a relatively stable parliamentary political system stemming from its history of British colonial rule. Current Prime Minister Bruce Golding of the Jamaica Labour Party was elected in September 2007 when his party defeated the long-ruling People's National Party led by then-Prime Minister Portia Simpson. In late May 2010, however, Jamaica's stability was challenged after Prime Minister Golding agreed to extradite to the United States an at-large alleged drug kingpin and gang leader, Christopher Coke. The Jamaican government deployed police and soldiers seeking to execute a warrant for Coke, but his armed supporters erected barricades and roadblocks to battle the security forces. In the ensuing violence,76 people were killed, including two policemen and a soldier. Human rights organizations have called on the government to conduct a thorough investigation into the killings, especially since Jamaica's police forces have been criticized for many years for extrajudicial killings and the indiscriminate use of force. Coke was ultimately captured and extradited to New York in late June 2010 to face drug and weapons trafficking charges.

High rates of crime and violence have plagued Jamaica for many years. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a high level of politically motivated violence when political parties became allied with armed gangs to deliver votes at election time. Jamaica's gangs initially were involved in the trafficking of marijuana in the 1970s (Jamaica is the Caribbean's largest producer and exporter of marijuana), but in the mid-1980s became involved in cocaine trafficking, with Jamaica used as a transit country, as well as weapons trafficking. Since the 1990s, much of the violent crime in the country has been associated with this drug trafficking and related intra-gang and internal gang feuds. Jamaica's challenges include bringing down the high levels of gang violence, reforming the police and justice system to prevent extrajudicial killings by police and impunity, and breaking the linkages between the political parties and armed gangs.

Jamaica's services-based economy has averaged only modest growth rates over the past two decades, and has been in recession since 2008 because of the global economic crisis, which hurt the tourism sector and reduced the price and demand for Jamaican bauxite/alumina exports. A difficult economic challenge for the government is dealing with a large external debt burden, which has limited the government's ability to respond to the effects of the global economic crisis. In February 2010, the International Monetary Fund approved a $1.27 billion stand-by arrangement to help the country deal with the consequences of the global economic downturn and support the government's fiscal, debt, and financial sector reforms.

U.S. relations with Jamaica are close, and are characterized by significant economic and cultural linkages and cooperation on a range of bilateral and transnational issues, including cooperation on anti-drug trafficking efforts. Congress has regularly supported a variety of foreign assistance programs for Jamaica, and the country will likely receive funding under the Administration's new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. There had been increasing tension in U.S.-Jamaican relations in recent months because of the Golding government's reluctance to extradite Christopher Coke to the United States, but in the aftermath of the Jamaican government's extradition, U.S. officials commended the Golding government for its efforts. For additional information, see CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements, and CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs.



Date of Report: July 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: R41318
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Monday, July 19, 2010

The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act


J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance


In December 2006, the 109th Congress passed the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE I), which included special trade rules that give preferential access to U.S. imports of Haitian apparel. These rules were intended to promote investment in the apparel industry as one element of a broader economic growth and development plan. HOPE I allowed for the duty-free treatment of select apparel imports from Haiti made from less expensive third-country inputs (e.g., non-regional yarns, fabrics, and components), provided Haiti met rules of origin and eligibility criteria that required making progress on worker rights, poverty reduction, and anti-corruption measures. Early assessments of the effectiveness of HOPE I, however, were disappointing. The 110th Congress responded by amending HOPE I with the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 (HOPE II). HOPE II extended the preferences for 10 years, expanded coverage of duty-free treatment to more apparel products, particularly knit articles, and simplified the rules, making them easier to use. Early evidence suggests that apparel production and exports are responding to these changes.

HOPE II also amended the eligibility requirements by requiring Haiti to create a new independent Labor Ombudsman's Office and establish the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) Program. The TAICNAR program provides for the United Nations International Labor Organization (ILO) to operate a firm-level inspection and monitoring program to help Haitian apparel factories comply with meeting core labor standards, Haitian labor laws, and occupational health and safety rules. It would apply to those firms that agree to register for the program as a prerequisite for utilizing the tariff preferences. The TAICNAR program is also designed to help Haiti develop its own capacity to monitor compliance of apparel producers in meeting core labor standards.

The earthquake that rocked Haiti on January 12, 2010 caused considerable damage to the apparel sector, although much has been done to return capacity to pre-earthquake levels. Rebuilding costs for the industry are estimated at $38 million to refurbish damaged buildings, replace machinery, and train new employees. The U.S. Congress responded to the apparel industry's needs by amending the HOPE Act with the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 (P.L. 111- 171), which improves U.S. market access for Haitian apparel exports. Two important considerations guided congressional action in addition to a broad-based concern over Haiti's economic and social problems. First, legislation appeared to focus on enhancing those preference rules that have so far shown the most promise for promoting investment, production, and apparel exports. Second, Congress factored in the possibility of negative effects on U.S. producers and workers, and in so doing sought a policy coherence that attempts to balance domestic and foreign policy considerations.

The HELP Act made a number of major changes to the trade preferences including extending the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the HOPE Act through September 30, 2020; allowing the value-added rule to remain at 50% through 2015; increasing the woven tariff preference level (TPL) to 200 million square meter equivalents (SMEs), with many exclusions to accommodate U.S. industry; expanding the knit TPL similarly; reducing the 3-for-1 earned import credit to 2-for-1; and expanding the list of products eligible for duty-free treatment under special assembly rules. The HELP Act requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to verify that apparel articles imported under the TPLs are not transshipped illegally into the United States, and to develop a plan to evaluate and improve Haiti's customs capabilities.



Date of Report: June 24, 2010
Number of Pages: 28
Order Number: RL34687
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Thursday, July 8, 2010

Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the “Holdouts”


J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

In December 2001, following an extended period of economic and political instability, Argentina suffered a severe financial crisis, leading to the largest default on sovereign debt in history. It was widely recognized that Argentina faced an untenable debt situation that was in need of restructuring. In 2005, after prolonged, contentious, and unsuccessful attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution with its creditors, Argentina abandoned the negotiation process and made a one-time unilateral offer on terms highly unfavorable to the creditors. Although 76% of creditors accepted the offer, a diverse group of "holdouts" opted instead for litigation in hopes of achieving a better settlement in the future. Although Argentina succeeded in reducing much of its sovereign debt, its unorthodox methods left it ostracized from international credit markets for a decade and triggered legislative action and sanctions in the United States.

Argentina still owes private creditors $20 billion in defaulted debt and $10 billion in past-due interest, as well as $6.2 billion to Paris Club countries. Of the disputed privately held debt, U.S. investors hold approximately $3 billion. The more activist investor groups have lobbied Congress to pressure Argentina to reopen debt negotiations. Some Members of Congress have introduced punitive legislation in both the 110th and 111th Congress, but to date it has not received any legislative action. Nearly five years after the original debt workout, however, a confluence of circumstances has persuaded Argentina to restructure the holdout debt, particularly the need to secure long-term public financing.

On April 30, 2010, Argentina announced a new $18.3 billion offer to exchange new bonds and cash for defaulted bonds held by the "holdouts." The exchange ran from May 3 to June 22, 2010. Two distinct offers were made, one for retail (small) investors, the other for institutional (large) investors. At settlement on August 2, 2010, retail investors will receive replacement bonds for the full face value of the defaulted bonds they currently hold. Past due interest will be paid in cash. Institutional investors will receive a discount bond equal to a 66.3% reduction in the face value of the defaulted debt they currently hold. Past due interest will be covered by a separate seven-year "Global" bond. Interest rates vary depending on the bond. Both groups of investors will receive a GDP-linked security called a warrant that provides for additional payments should the Argentine economy grow at rates higher that anticipated and stipulated in the prospectus.

The 2010 offer drew sufficient support to retire most of the remaining defaulted debt. Analysts estimate 66% of bondholders participated, leading to a total participation rate of 92% for the 2001 default, if the 76% tendered in the 2005 workout is included. Historically, a greater than 90% threshold of participation has allowed countries to eventually return to the international capital markets. The $6.2 billion of bonds not exchanged are held largely by a group of Italian retail investors and various institutional "vulture" funds, which continue to litigate. Court reactions to these holdouts are not easy to predict, but technically any judgments against Argentina would still be in place for untendered defaulted bonds. It remains to be seen, and opinions vary, as to whether Argentina will be able to address these bondholders in some way that will allow for a return to the international capital markets in the near future.

If there is a legacy to the Argentine case, it may be in the changes to bond contracts that seek to improve outcomes for creditors. One option is the use of collective action clauses (CACs), now standard for sovereign debt, which require all creditors to bargain collectively, with a compulsory majority decision applicable to all bondholders. It is no coincidence that both the 2005 and 2010 Argentine exchanges are governed by CACs.


Date of Report: July 2, 2010
Number of Pages: 18
Order Number: R41029
Price: $29.95

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Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Honduran-U.S. Relations


Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

On January 27, 2010, Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo Sosa was inaugurated President of Honduras. Lobo assumed power after seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that had resulted from the June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. While the strength of Lobo's National Party in the legislature should help the government secure approval of its policy agenda, the political crisis left the new President with daunting challenges, including a high level of domestic political polarization, difficulty securing international recognition, a battered economy, and a poor human rights situation exacerbated by the murders of journalists and human rights defenders. Moreover, for a number of years, Honduras has had a poor security situation with high rates of violent crime.

The Honduran economy has undergone significant changes since the 1990s. While traditional agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are still important, nontraditional sectors, especially the maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown significantly. Substantial economic growth helped reduce poverty, but the country's political crisis and the global economic downturn in 2009 led to an economic contraction. The country continues to face high poverty, estimated at almost 69%, as well as high infant mortality and a significant HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Although relations were strained during the political crisis, the United States has traditionally had a close relationship with Honduras. Broad U.S. policy goals include a strengthened democracy with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved living conditions. In addition to providing Honduras with substantial amounts of foreign assistance and maintaining significant military and economic ties, the United States cooperates with Honduras to deal with transnational issues such as illegal migration, crime, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and port security.

With respect to the political crisis, several resolutions were introduced during the first session of the 111th Congress. These ranged from condemning Zelaya for his "unconstitutional and illegal" actions (H.Res. 619, Mack) to condemning the "coup d'état" in Honduras (H.Res. 630, Delahunt) and calling upon the Micheletti government to end its "illegal seizure of power" (H.Res. 620, Serrano). Another resolution (H.Res. 749, Ros-Lehtinen) called on the Obama Administration to recognize the November 2009 elections "as an important step in the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in Honduras." In the second session, H.Res. 1197 (Rohrabacher) would express support for democracy in Honduras and call on nations to restore normal relations with the government of Honduras.

This report examines current political and economic conditions in Honduras as well as issues in Honduran-U.S. relations. For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009-January 2010.

For additional information, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues, CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues
.


Date of Report: June 18, 2010
Number of Pages: 26
Order Number: RL34027
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