Celinda Franco
Specialist in Crime Policy
Two predominantly Latino gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang (M-18), have raised concern among policy makers for a number of reasons, including (1) membership in these gangs has spread from the Los Angeles area to other communities across the United States; (2) these gangs are considered "transnational," primarily because MS-13 and M-18 cliques are being established in Central America and Mexico; (3) there are reports suggesting that these gangs are engaged in criminal enterprises normally associated with better organized and more sophisticated crime syndicates; and (4) MS-13 and M-18 gang members may be involved in smuggling operations and, by extension, could potentially use their skills and criminal networks to smuggle terrorists into the United States. To date, however, no evidence exists establishing a link between MS-13 and M-18 members and terrorists.
Nevertheless, some observers maintain that these two gangs may develop the capacity to become organized criminal enterprises capable of coordinating illegal activities across national borders. Yet, others find them to be no more criminally organized or sophisticated than other street gangs. At issue for Congress is whether the MS-13 and M-18 gangs constitute an emerging transnational criminal threat.
The federal response to the MS-13 and M-18 gang problem has largely involved the enforcement of criminal and immigration laws, including the deportation of alien gang members. More recently, federal efforts have focused on prosecuting gang members under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. Deported alien gang members have established MS-13 and M-18 gang cliques in their home countries, and some experts suggest that U.S. deportation policies have effectively transported U.S.-styled gang culture to parts of Central America and Mexico. Moreover, evidence shows that deported alien MS-13 and M-18 gang members have established a "revolving door" migratory pattern of repeat illegal reentry into the United States, raising concerns that these "migratory" alien gang members may become involved in narco-trafficking, smuggling, and other criminal activities along the U.S.-Mexico border.
This report will be updated periodically.
Date of Report: January 22, 2010
Number of Pages: 20
Order Number: RL34233
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Thursday, February 4, 2010
The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?
Gangs in Central America
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
During its second session, the 111th Congress is likely to maintain an interest in the effects of crime and gang violence in Central America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. The violent Mara Salvatrucha (MS- 13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang (also known as M-18) continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have among the highest homicide rates in the world. Governments in those countries appear to have moved away, at least on a rhetorical level, from repressive anti-gang strategies. However, they have yet to implement effective anti-gang policies that include an emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation of former gang members.
U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the expanding presence of the MS-13 and M-18 in cities across the United States, as well as reports that these gangs may be evolving into more sophisticated transnational criminal enterprises. Between February 2005 and September 2009, U.S. officials arrested some 2,572 alleged MS-13 members in cities across the United States, many of whom were subsequently deported. Evidence suggests, however, that previously deported members of both the MS-13 and the M-18 often reenter the United States illegally across the U.S.-Mexico border.
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. An inter-agency committee worked together to develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, first announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American Integration System (SICA) summit on security issues. The strategy, which is now being implemented, states that the U.S. government will pursue coordinated anti-gang activities through five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention.
In recent years, Congress has increased funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress appropriated roughly $7.9 million in FY2008 and $5 million in FY2009 in global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Mérida Initiative, including, by CRS calculation, at least $22 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and close to $19 million in FY2009 funding. On December 13, 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117), which provides $83 million for combating gangs and drug trafficking in Central America under a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). P.L. 111-117 also includes $8 million in global INCLE for gang programs in the region.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. For more information on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues. For information on Central American gangs in the United States, see CRS Report RL34233, The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?, by Celinda Franco.
Date of Report: January 11, 2010
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: RL34112
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Tuesday, February 2, 2010
ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues
M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) extends special duty treatment to certain U.S. imports that meet domestic content and other requirements from designated countries in the Andean region. The purpose of ATPA is to promote economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from dependence on illegal drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. The countries originally designated to qualify for trade preferences under ATPA were Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. However, trade preferences for Bolivia were suspended on December 15, 2008, by the Bush Administration because Bolivia failed to meet ATPA eligibility criteria. In his June 2009 report to Congress, President Obama extended the Bush Administration's determination that Bolivia failed to meet eligibility criteria. Bolivia may only be reinstated as a beneficiary country under ATPA if Congress approves legislation to do so.
ATPA (Title II of P.L. 102-182) was enacted on December 4, 1991. It was renewed and modified under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107- 210) on August 6, 2002, extending trade preferences until December 31, 2006. Since that time, Congress has favored short-term extensions of ATPA. The most recent extension of ATPA continued trade preferences for Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru until December 31, 2010 (P.L. 111- 124). On December 14, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the bill to extend trade preferences for the three countries by unanimous consent (H.R. 4284). On December 22, 2010, the U.S. Senate passed the measure, also by unanimous consent. The bill was signed into law by President Obama on December 28, 2009. Without this extension, the program would have expired on December 31, 2009.
The previous extension of ATPA (P.L. 110-436) extended preferences for Colombia and Peru until December 31, 2009, and until June 30, 2009, for Bolivia and Ecuador, with possible six-month extensions for Bolivia and Ecuador under certain conditions. For Ecuador, preferences were to be automatically renewed unless the President found that Ecuador was in violation of the eligibility criteria. On June 30, 2009, President Obama issued a report to Congress continuing Ecuador's eligibility for ATPA trade benefits through the end of 2009. For Bolivia, ATPA trade preferences were to be extended only if the President determined that Bolivia had met program eligibility criteria. However, President Bush suspended Bolivia's designation as a beneficiary country in late 2008 because of its failure to meet the eligibility criteria. In June 2009, President Obama extended the Bush Administration's determination that Bolivia failed to meet ATPA criteria.
In the second session of the 111th Congress, policymakers may reevaluate the extension of ATPA trade preferences for Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru, and could decide to reconsider the suspension of preferences for Bolivia. Policymakers may also consider broader reform of U.S. trade preference programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences. Some Members of Congress believe that if ATPA trade preferences are not extended, the United States and the Andean countries risk losing some of the economic progress that has been achieved over the eighteen-year life of the program. Supporters of ATPA argue that the program should continue to reinforce the U.S. commitment to the "alternative development" counternarcotics strategy. Critics of ATPA argue that unilateral trade programs are ineffective; that the ATPA has forced U.S. producers to compete with lower-cost Andean imports; and, in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, that trade preferences should not be extended to countries that do not support U.S. foreign and trade policies.
Date of Report: January 21, 2010
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: RS22548
Price: $29.95
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Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Labor Issues
Mary Jane Bolle
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
On April 12, 2006, the United States and Peru signed the proposed U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA). On June 25, 2007, the Administration released a revised text with new labor, environment, and other provisions. This "final text" language reflected a Congress- Administration "New Trade Policy for America" announced on May 10 that incorporated key Democratic priorities. Supporters of the agreement argue that Peru has ratified all eight International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and that the PTPA would reinforce Peru's labor reform measures of recent years. Critics are concerned about the potential for enforcement of the standards. Peru PTA implementing legislation (H.R. 3688) passed the House on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; passed the Senate on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and was signed by President Bush on December 14 (P.L. 110-138). It went into effect on February 1, 2009. See also CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.- Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal, and CRS Report RL33864, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor Standards Issues, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Date of Report: January 21, 2010
Number of Pages: 9
Order Number: RS22521
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Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug-related violence claimed more than 6,500 lives in Mexico in 2009, and several Central American countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world. Mexican DTOs dominate the illicit drug market in the United States and are expanding their operations by forming partnerships with U.S. gangs. As a result, some of the drug-related violence in Mexico has spilled over into the United States.
On October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a proposed package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010. Congress appropriated roughly $1.3 billion for Mexico and Central America, as well as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111- 8), and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32). Each of these Acts contained human rights conditions on 15% of certain law enforcement and military assistance provided. Throughout 2009, drug-related violence in Mexico and the potential threat of spillover along the Southwest border focused congressional concern on the pace of implementation of the Mérida Initiative. On December 3, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for the Mérida Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAO found that $830 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico and Central America had been obligated by the State Department, but only $26 million of the funds had actually been spent. The pace of implementation has accelerated since that time, particularly in Mexico, but implementation challenges remain.
For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $450 million in Mérida funding for Mexico and $100 million for Central America. On December 13, 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117), which allows for $210.3 million for Mexico and $83 million for Central America under a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). These Mexico (Mérida) and Central America (CARSI) funds are subject to the same human rights conditions as those provided in P.L. 111-8. Congress also provided $37 million in P.L. 111-117 for a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
During its second session, the 111th Congress is likely to maintain a strong interest in how well U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts are implementing the Mérida Initiative and the degree to which the nations involved are fulfilling their domestic obligations under Mérida. Congress may also monitor enforcement of Mérida's human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. Congress is likely to play a role in the design of post-Mérida security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin during its consideration of the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget request. This report provides an overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative, the status of Mérida implementation, and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the Initiative. For related information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R40582, Mexico's Drug-Related Violence.
Date of Report: January 21, 2010
Number of Pages: 31
Order Number: R40135
Price: $29.95
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