Search Penny Hill Press

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act

J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

In December 2006, the 109th Congress passed the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE I), which included special trade rules that give preferential access to U.S. imports of Haitian apparel. These rules were intended to promote investment in the apparel industry as one element of a broader economic growth and development plan. HOPE I allowed for the duty-free treatment of select apparel imports from Haiti made from less expensive third-country inputs (e.g., non-regional yarns, fabrics, and components), provided Haiti met rules of origin and eligibility criteria that required making progress on worker rights, poverty reduction, and anti-corruption measures. Early assessments of the effectiveness of HOPE I, however, were disappointing. The 110th Congress responded by amending HOPE I in the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 (HOPE II). HOPE II extended the preferences for 10 years, expanded coverage of duty-free treatment to more apparel products, particularly knit articles, and simplified the rules, making them easier to use. Early evidence suggests that apparel production and exports are responding to these changes. 

HOPE II also amended the eligibility requirements by requiring Haiti to create a new independent Labor Ombudsman's Office and establish the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) Program. The TAICNAR program provides for the United Nations International Labor Organization (ILO) to operate a firm-level inspection and monitoring program to help Haitian apparel factories comply with meeting core labor standards, Haitian labor laws, and occupational health and safety rules. It would apply to those firms that agree to register for the program as a prerequisite for utilizing the tariff preferences. The TAICNAR program is also designed to help Haiti develop its own capacity to monitor compliance of apparel producers in meeting core labor standards. 

The earthquake that rocked Haiti on January 12, 2010, caused considerable damage to the apparel sector, although much has been done to return capacity to pre-earthquake levels. Estimates of rebuilding costs for the industry begin at $38 million to refurbish damaged buildings, replace machinery, and train new employees. The U.S. Congress has chosen to respond to Haiti's needs by amending the HOPE Act to enhance even further U.S. market access for Haitian apparel and other exports. Two important considerations guided congressional action in addition to a broadbased concern over Haiti's economic and social problems. First, legislation appeared to focus on enhancing those preference rules that have so far shown the most promise for promoting investment, production, and apparel exports. Second, Congress, in considering amendments to the preference rules, openly considered the possible negative effects on U.S. producers and workers. In so doing, Congress has attempted to achieve a policy coherence that reconciles domestic and foreign policy considerations. 

Major changes to the trade preferences include: extending the Caribbean Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the HOPE Act through September 30, 2020; allowing the value-added rule to remain at 50% through 2015; increasing the woven tariff preference level (TPL) to 200 million square meter equivalents (SMEs), with many exclusions to accommodate U.S. industry; expanding the knit TPL similarly; reducing the 3-for-1 earned import credit to 2-for-1; and expanding the list of products eligible for special assembly rules. The HELP Act requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to verify that apparel articles imported under the TPLs are not transshipped illegally into the United States. CBP is also to evaluate Haiti's customs requirements and set out a plan to improve their capabilities.



Date of Report: May 20, 2010
Number of Pages: 28
Order Number: RL34687
Price: $29.95

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Thursday, May 20, 2010

Political Status of Puerto Rico: Options for Congress

Keith Bea
Specialist in American National Government

R. Sam Garrett
Analyst in American National Government

The United States acquired the islands of Puerto Rico in 1898 after the Spanish-American War. In 1950, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 81-600) authorizing Puerto Rico to hold a constitutional convention and in 1952, the people of Puerto Rico ratified a constitution establishing a republican form of government for the island. After being approved by Congress and the President in July 1952 and thus given force under federal law (P.L. 82-447), the new constitution went into effect on July 25, 1952. 

Puerto Rico is subject to congressional jurisdiction under the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Over the past century, Congress passed legislation governing Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States. For example, residents of Puerto Rico hold U.S. citizenship, serve in the military, are subject to federal laws, and are represented in the House of Representatives by a Resident Commissioner elected to a four-year term. Although residents participate in the presidential nominating process, they do not vote in the general election. Puerto Ricans pay federal tax on income derived from sources in the mainland United States, but they pay no federal tax on income earned in Puerto Rico. In the 111th Congress, the Resident Commissioner may vote in legislative committees and in the Committee of the Whole. 

Elements of the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship have been and continue to be matters of debate. Some contend that the current political status of Puerto Rico, perhaps with enhancements, remains a viable option. Others argue that commonwealth status is or should be only a temporary fix to be resolved in favor of other solutions considered permanent, non-colonial, and nonterritorial. Some contend that if independence is achieved, the close relationship with the United States could be continued through compact negotiations with the federal government. One element apparently shared by all involved is that the people of Puerto Rico seek to attain full, democratic representation, notably through voting rights on national legislation to which they are subject. 

On April 29, 2010, for the first time since 1998, the House approved (223-169) status-related legislation for Puerto Rico. H.R. 2499 (Pierluisi) would authorize a two-stage plebiscite in Puerto Rico to reconsider the status issue. As passed by the House, the bill provides that if a majority of voters opt for a change in status in the first plebiscite, a slate of four options (independence, sovereignty in association with the United States, statehood, and commonwealth) would be on the ballot for the second plebiscite. Approval of any one of these options by the Puerto Rican voters would arguably set the stage for, but would not mandate, further congressional action.


Date of Report: May 12, 2010
Number of Pages: 58
Order Number: RL32933
Price: $29.95

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Thursday, May 13, 2010

Panama: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs


With five successive elected civilian governments, the Central American nation of Panama has made notable political and economic progress since the 1989 U.S. military intervention that ousted the regime of General Manuel Noriega from power. Current President Ricardo Martinelli of the center-right Democratic Change (CD) party was elected in May 2009, defeating the ruling center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in a landslide. Martinelli was inaugurated to a five-year term on July 1, 2009. Martinelli's s Alliance for Change coalition also captured a majority of seats in Panama's National Assembly that will increase the chances that the President will be able to secure enough votes to enact his legislative agenda. 

A significant challenge facing the Martinelli government has been dealing with the economic fallout stemming from the global economic recession, but while the growth of Panama's servicebased economy has slowed, it has avoided the economic contraction experienced by many Latin American economies. The Panama Canal expansion project has played a large role in stimulating economic growth. President Martinelli has called for a number of large public infrastructure projects, including a subway for Panama City, and the government has begun to move ahead on some of these projects. In March 2010, President Martinelli secured legislative approval of a tax reform measure that reduces corporate and individual income taxes while raising sales and other taxes that overall is expected to increase government revenue. 

The United States has close relations with Panama, stemming in large part from the extensive linkages developed when the canal was under U.S. control and Panama hosted major U.S. military installations. The current relationship is characterized by extensive counternarcotics cooperation, assistance to help Panama assure the security of the Canal, and a proposed bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). U.S. bilateral assistance amounted to a $3.7 million in FY2008, $7.6 million in FY2009, and an estimated $8.7 million in FY2010. The FY2011 request is for $10.6 million. This funding does not include an estimated $11 million Panama received in FY2008 and FY2009 under the Mérida Initiative to assist Mexico and Central American countries in their efforts to combat drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime; beginning in FY2010, Panama will receive assistance under the successor Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) instead of under the Mérida Initiative. 

In June 2007, the United States and Panama signed a proposed bilateral FTA, and Panama's National Assembly overwhelmingly approved the agreement in July 2007. While the 111th Congress could consider implementing legislation for the FTA, a number of observers believe that it is unlikely that it will be considered this year. Final issues being worked out relate to worker rights and to Panama's bank secrecy laws. H.Res. 987 (Frelinghuysen), introduced in December 2009, would express the sense of the House that the FTA with Panama should be implemented immediately, and H.Res. 1124 (Mack), introduced in February 2010, would call on President Obama to submit the Panama FTA to Congress and work to ensure that it is approved. 

For more, see CRS Report RL32540,
The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement, CRS Report R40622, Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues, and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America.


Date of Report: May 5, 2010
Number of Pages:28
Order Number:RL30981
Price: $29.95

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail
Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the “Holdouts”

J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance


In December 2001, following an extended period of economic and political instability, Argentina suffered a severe financial crisis, leading to the largest default on sovereign debt in history. It was widely recognized that Argentina faced an untenable debt situation that was in need of restructuring. In 2005, after prolonged, contentious, and unsuccessful attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution with its creditors, Argentina abandoned the negotiation process and made a one-time unilateral offer on terms highly unfavorable to the creditors. Although 76% of creditors accepted the offer, a diverse group of "holdouts" opted instead for litigation in hopes of achieving a better settlement in the future. Although Argentina succeeded in reducing much of its sovereign debt, its unorthodox methods left it ostracized from international credit markets for nearly a decade and triggered legislative action and sanctions in the United States. 

Argentina still owes private creditors $20 billion in defaulted debt and $10 billion in past-due interest, as well as $6.2 billion to Paris Club countries. Of the disputed privately held debt, U.S. investors hold approximately $3 billion. The more activist investor groups have lobbied Congress to pressure Argentina to reopen debt negotiations. Some Members of Congress have introduced punitive legislation in both the 110th and 111th Congress, but to date it has not received any legislative action. Nearly five years after the original debt workout, however, a confluence of circumstances has persuaded Argentina to restructure the holdout debt, particularly the need to secure long-term public financing. 

On April 15, 2010, Argentina announced the key features of the proposed bond deal, which will be made in a formal offer on April 30, 2010. Argentina expects to complete the process in June 2010. Two offers are proposed, one for retail (small) investors, the other for institutional (large) investors. Retail investors will receive replacement bonds for the full face value of the defaulted bonds they currently hold. Past due interest will be paid in cash. Institutional investors will receive a discount bond equal to a 66.3% reduction in the face value of the defaulted debt they currently hold (the so-called "haircut"). Past due interest will be covered by a separate seven-year "Global" bond. Interest rates vary depending on the bond. Both groups of investors will receive a GDP-linked security called a warrant that provides for additional payments should the Argentine economy grow at rates higher that anticipated and stipulated in the final prospectus. Analysts value the deal at between 48 and 51 cents on the dollar, compared to 60 cents for the 2005 exchange. 

For Argentina, a successful restructuring requires a sufficiently large participation rate to eliminate most of the existing judgments and attachment orders. Argentina expects, with no guarantee, that such an outcome will lead to renewed access to the international credit markets. Historically, sovereign debt workouts with at least a 90% participation rate have achieved this goal. Since holdouts compose 24% of the original bondholders, a 60% participation rate of this group would allow for the total participation rate to reach the 90% threshold, including the 2005 exchange. If the exchange succeeds, Argentina will have completed a sovereign debt restructuring with the deepest write-off of principal in history. Many original bondholders were severely hurt by this deal, as was Argentina by the crisis. Secondary market participants may see a sizable profit. If there is a legacy to the Argentine case, it may be in the changes to bond contracts that seek to improve outcomes for creditors. One option is the use of collective action clauses (CACs), now standard for sovereign debt, which require all creditors to bargain collectively, with a compulsory majority decision applicable to all bondholders.



Date of Report: April 28, 2010
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: R41029
Price: $29.95

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Thursday, May 6, 2010

Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program

Randy Schnepf
Specialist in Agricultural Policy

In 2002, Brazil—a major cotton export competitor—expressed its growing concerns about U.S. cotton subsidies by initiating a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement case (DS267) against specific provisions of the U.S. cotton program. In September 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled against the United States on several key issues. It found both (1) prohibited U.S. export subsidies (related to Step 2 program payments and export credit guarantees under the GSM-102 program) and (2) actionable U.S. domestic support measures (i.e., marketing loan benefits and counter-cyclical program payments) that resulted in adverse effects against Brazil's commercial interests. In March 2005, a WTO Appellate Body upheld the panel's ruling on appeal, and provided specific deadlines for removal or modification of the offending U.S. subsidies. Shortly after the March 2005 ruling, the United States made several changes to both its cotton and GSM-102 programs in an attempt to bring them into compliance with WTO recommendations. However, Brazil argued that the U.S. response was inadequate, and requested a WTO compliance panel in August 2006 to review U.S. compliance with the previous rulings. This panel ruled against the United States in December 2007, and the ruling was upheld on appeal in June 2008. 

Brazil proposed trade retaliation of nearly $3 billion against U.S. goods and services. The United States disagreed and a subsequent WTO arbitration panel, in August 2009, generally found in favor of Brazil's retaliation requests but at formula-based levels substantially reduced from those requested by Brazil. The panel also ruled that Brazil would be entitled to cross-retaliation if the overall retaliation amount exceeded a formula-based variable annual threshold. Cross-retaliation involves countermeasures in sectors outside of the trade in goods, most notably in the area of U.S. copyrights and patents. In December 2009, Brazil announced that it would impose trade retaliation against up to $829.3 million in U.S. goods in 2010 (based on the WTO formulas using 2008 data). In addition, Brazil announced that the WTO arbitrator's formula yielded a threshold estimate of $561 million, which implied $268.3 million in eligible cross-retaliatory countermeasures. In March 2010, Brazil released a list of 102 goods of U.S. origin valued at $561 million that would be subject to import tariffs of up to 100%, followed by a preliminary list of U.S. patents and intellectual property rights valued at $268 million that it could restrict. Brazil announced an April 6 deadline for imposing the tariffs, barring a joint settlement. 

Brazil and the United States were engaged in intense negotiations to find a mutual agreement to avoid the trade retaliation prior to the April 6 deadline. On April 5, 2010, the United States offered a three-point proposal including establishment of a $147.3 million annual fund to provide technical assistance and capacity-building for Brazil's cotton sector, near-term modifications to the operation of the GSM-102 program, and special recognition for certain Brazilian beef imports into the United States. As a result, Brazil agreed to postpone until April 22 the implementation of WTO-approved countermeasures. 

The U.S. proposal was solidified when, on April 6, USDA cancelled unutilized balances of GSM- 102 funding for FY2010 and, on April 19, USDA announced new fee rates for its GSM-102 program. Then, on April 16, USDA published a proposed rule on Brazilian meat imports, and on April 20 the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that officially detailed the specifics of the $147.3 million fund. As a result, Brazil extended the suspension of trade retaliation an additional 60 days until mid-June. The two sides continue to negotiate on changes to the nature of U.S. domestic cotton programs. However, Brazil retains its full rights of retaliation pending a negotiated settlement.


Date of Report: April 28, 2010
Number of Pages: 42
Order Number: RL32571
Price: $29.95

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.