Tuesday, September 11, 2012
Venezuela: Issues for Congress
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Under the rule of populist President Hugo Chávez, first elected in 1998 and reelected to a six-year term in December 2006, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes, with a new constitution and unicameral legislature, and even a new name for the country, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Human rights organizations have expressed concerns about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of expression under the Chávez government. Venezuela is scheduled to hold its next presidential election on October 7, 2012, with President Chávez running against Henrique Capriles Radonski, the unified opposition candidate. While Chávez’s continued popularity and use of state resources bode well for his reelection, high rates of crime, inflation, and other economic problems could erode his support. Until recently, a wildcard in the election was the health status of President Chávez, but at this juncture Chávez appears to have bounced back from two bouts of an undisclosed form of cancer. Looking ahead, however, Chávez’s health status raises questions about Venezuela’s political future.
U.S. Policy
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign oil, but there has been friction and tensions in relations under the Chávez government. Over the years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military arms purchases, its relations with Cuba and Iran, and its efforts to export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries. Declining cooperation on anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts has been a major concern. The United States has imposed sanctions: on several Venezuelan government and military officials for allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons trafficking; on three Venezuelan companies for providing support to Iran; and on two Venezuelan individuals for providing support to Hezbollah. Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts.
Legislative Initiatives
As in past years, there have been concerns in the 112th Congress regarding the state of Venezuela’s democracy and human rights situation and its deepening relations with Iran. H.R. 3783, approved by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 7, 2012, would require the Administration to develop a “strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” H.R. 2542, approved by the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere December 15, 2011, would withhold some assistance to the Organization of American States unless that body took action to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter regarding the status of democracy in Venezuela. H.R. 2583, approved by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs July 19, 2011, includes a provision that would prohibit aid to the government of Venezuela. Other legislative initiatives include H.Res. 247, which would call on the Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism; and H.R. 6067, which includes a section imposing restrictions on U.S. nuclear cooperation with any country assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba.
In action on the FY2013 foreign aid appropriations, the report to the House Appropriations Committee bill, H.R. 5857 (H.Rept. 112-494, reported May 25, 2012), directs that $5 million in
Economic Support Funds be provided for democracy programs in Venezuela, the same amount appropriated in FY2012, and $2 million more than requested by the Administration. In contrast, the report to the Senate Appropriations Committee bill, S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172, reported May 24, 2012), recommends $3 million for democracy programs in Venezuela to be administered by the National Endowment for Democracy
Date of Report: August 30, 2012
Number of Pages: 60
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Monday, August 27, 2012
El Salvador: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
The United States has maintained a strong interest in developments in El Salvador, a small Central American country with a population of 6 million. During the 1980s, El Salvador was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America as its government struggled against the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgency during a 12-year civil war. A peace accord negotiated in 1992 brought the war to an end and formally assimilated the FMLN into the political process as a political party. After the peace accords were signed, U.S. involvement shifted toward helping successive Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) governments rebuild democracy and implement market-friendly economic reforms.
In March 2009, Mauricio Funes, a former television journalist and the first FMLN presidential candidate without a guerilla past, defeated Rodrigo Ávila of the conservative ARENA party for a five-year presidential term. His inauguration marked the end of more than 20 years of ARENA rule and the first transfer of political power between parties since the end of El Salvador’s civil war. Funes’ victory followed strong showings by the FMLN in the January 2009 legislative elections. During the first half of his term, President Funes generally pursued moderate policies that enabled him to form cross-party coalitions in the National Assembly, but which caused periodic friction between him and more radical members of his party.
Now in his fourth year in office, President Funes still has high approval ratings (65% in June 2012), but faces a number of serious political, economic and security challenges. Since Funes is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection, his political influence has weakened since ARENA replaced the FMLN as the largest party in the legislature as a result of March 2012 elections and both parties have started focusing on the 2014 presidential contest. Nevertheless, Funes is currently trying to help resolve a standoff between the Salvadoran judiciary and legislature over the composition and power of the Supreme Court. The Funes Administration is also seeking to strengthen El Salvador’s recovery from the 2009 global economic crisis. Although the country received significant support from international donors to support its recovery, economic growth has been inhibited by low productivity, natural disasters that have damaged agricultural crops, and insecurity that has deterred investment. Finally, in an attempt to address the country’s high rate of violent crime, the Funes government endorsed a historic—and risky— truce involving the country’s largest gangs. The truce seems to have resulted in a dramatic reduction in homicides since March 2012.
Maintaining close ties with the United States has been a primary foreign policy goal of successive Salvadoran governments, including the Funes Administration. During a March 2011 visit to El Salvador, President Barack Obama praised Funes’ “courageous work to overcome old divisions in Salvadoran society and to show that progress comes through pragmatism.” Both leaders pledged to work together to boost economic growth in El Salvador through the new Partnership for Growth (PFG) initiative and to more effectively ensure citizen security. The PFG commits both governments to work closely together to boost competitiveness in El Salvador and reduce insecurity in the country. U.S. bilateral assistance, which totaled $28.2 million in FY2012, as well as aid provided through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is supporting PFG priorities. El Salvador is the only country in Latin America for which the Administration requested a substantial increase in funding—to $41.8 million—for FY2013. In addition, the MCC has determined that El Salvador is eligible to submit a proposal for a second compact to develop its southern coastal region.
Date of Report: August 13, 2012
Number of Pages: 21
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Monday, August 20, 2012
Latin America and the Caribbean: Fact Sheet on Economic and Social Indicators
Julissa Gomez-Granger
Information Research Specialist
This fact sheet tracks selected economic and social development indicators for Latin American and Caribbean countries. Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate levels of human development throughout the region. Table 3 classifies country economies by income. This fact sheet shows the most recent data available from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Date of Report: August 8, 2012
Number of Pages: 5
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Thursday, August 16, 2012
Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. During that time, economic and social stability improved considerably, and many analysts believed Haiti was turning a corner toward sustainable development. Unfortunately, Haiti’s development was set back by a massive earthquake in January 2010 that devastated much of the capital of Port-au-Prince and other parts of the country. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide: Haiti remains the poorest country in the western hemisphere.
Haiti is the Obama Administration’s top foreign assistance priority for Latin American and Caribbean countries. Haiti's developmental needs and priorities are many. The Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing a 10-year recovery plan focusing on territorial, economic, social, and institutional rebuilding. An outbreak of cholera that began in late 2010 has swept across most of the country and further complicated assistance efforts after the earthquake. While some progress has been made in developing democratic institutions, they remain weak. Following yet another controversial, sometimes violent election process, Haiti saw its first peaceful, democratic transfer of power between presidents of opposing parties in May 2011. Outgoing President René Préval handed the presidential sash to President Michel Martelly, a popular musician without any previous political experience. Martelly’s administration was without a prime minister for most of his first year in office, hampering reconstruction efforts. Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe assumed his post in May, and visited Washington in July 2012.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government in 2004. MINUSTAH's current strength is 10,773 troops. The mission has helped facilitate elections, conducted campaigns to combat gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian National Police, and played a key role in emergency responses to natural disasters, especially after the earthquake. Nonetheless, popular protests have called for MINUSTAH’s withdrawal because of allegations regarding its role in introducing cholera to the country and sexual abuse by some of its forces.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes, continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; and alleviating poverty. The Obama Administration granted Temporary Protected Status to Haitians living in the United States at the time of the earthquake.
Congressional concerns include the pace and effectiveness of reconstruction; respect for human rights, particularly for women; counternarcotics efforts; and security issues. Congress is also concerned that overdue Senate and local elections, which the government says will be held by year’s end, be scheduled and be free, fair, and peaceful.
Current law related to Haiti includes P.L. 112-74, P.L. 111-171, P.L. 110-246, and P.L. 109-432. Pending legislation related to Haiti includes H.R. 1016/S. 1576, H.R. 3711, H.R. 3771, H.Res. 510, H.Res. 521/S.Res. 352, S. 1023, S.Res. 26, S.Res. 352, and S.Res. 368. For details see “Legislation in the 112th Congress.”
Date of Report: August 1, 2012
Number of Pages: 26
Order Number: R42559
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Monday, August 13, 2012
Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Violence has been an inherent feature of the trade in illicit drugs, but the violence generated by Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years has been unprecedented and remarkably brutal. The tactics—including mass killings, the use of torture and dismemberment, and the phenomena of car bombs—have led some analysts to speculate whether the violence has been transformed into something new, perhaps requiring a different set of policy responses. According to government and other data, the best estimates are that there were slightly more than 50,000 homicides related to organized crime from December 2006 through December 2011. Some analysts see in this year’s data about Mexico’s organized crime-related homicides the possibility that the violence may have peaked or reached a plateau, if it has not begun to decline. Many observers maintain that the steep increase in organized crime-related homicides in recent years is likely to trend down far more slowly.
In December 2006, Mexico’s newly inaugurated President Felipe Calderón launched an aggressive campaign against the DTOs—an initiative that has defined his administration—that has been met with a violent response from the DTOs. Of the seven most significant DTOs operating during the first five years of the Calderón Administration, the government successfully removed key leaders from each of them, through arrests or by death in arrest efforts. However, these efforts add to the dynamic of change—consolidation or fragmentation, succession struggles and new competition—that generate more conflict and violence among competing criminal groups. In the last six years, fragments of some of the DTOs have formed new criminal organizations, while two DTOs have become dominant and polarized rivals: the Sinaloa DTO in the western part of the country and Los Zetas in the east. In addition, the DTOs have increasingly diversified into other criminal activities, now posing a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to governance in Mexico.
U.S. citizens have also been victims of the security crisis in Mexico. In March 2010, three individuals connected to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juárez, two of them U.S. citizens, were killed by a gang working for one of the major DTOs operating in that city. In February 2011, two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were shot, one fatally, allegedly by Los Zetas, one of Mexico’s most violent DTOs. In the U.S. Congress, these events have raised concerns about the stability of a strategic partner and neighbor. Congress is also concerned about the possibility of “spillover” violence along the U.S. border and further inland. The 112th Congress has held several hearings on DTO violence, the efforts by the Calderón government to address the situation, and implications of the violence for the United States. Members have maintained close oversight of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and related bilateral issues.
This report provides background on drug trafficking in Mexico: it identifies the major DTOs; how the organized crime “landscape” has been altered by fragmentation; and analyzes the context, scope, and scale of the violence. It examines current trends of the violence, analyzes prospects for curbing violence in the future, and compares it with violence in Colombia. For background on U.S. policy responses to the security crisis in Mexico, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond. For a discussion of the problem of violence “spilling over” into the United States, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence. For general background on Mexico, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress.
Date of Report: August 3, 2012
Number of Pages: 47
Order Number: R41576
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