Gangs in Central America

Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America, as well as domestic anti-gang programs. Two recent developments may affect congressional interest in Central American gangs: a truce between rival gangs has lowered violence in El Salvador, and the U.S. Treasury Department has designated the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) as a significant transnational criminal organization (TCO).

MS-13 and its main rival, the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18), continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have had among the highest homicide rates in the world. Recently, some governments have moved away from repressive anti-gang strategies, with the government of El Salvador now facilitating a historic— and risky—truce involving the country’s largest gangs. The truce has contributed to a large reduction in homicides since March 2012, but robberies, assaults, and extortions have continued. The truce carries risks for the Salvadoran government, such as what might happen if the gangs were to walk away from the truce stronger, better organized, and with more political clout.

U.S. agencies have been engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive sides of dealing with Central American gangs; an inter-agency committee developed a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico that was first announced in July 2007. The strategy focuses on diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. agencies consider strengthening the anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide its implementation. U.S. law enforcement efforts may be bolstered by the Treasury Department’s October 2012 decision to designate and sanction MS-13 as a major TCO pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.

In recent years, Congress has increased funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Between FY2008 and FY2012, Congress appropriated roughly $35 million in global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central America, and, more recently, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the impact of the Treasury Department’s TCO designation on law enforcement efforts against MS-13.

This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Also see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.


Date of Report: January 28, 2013
Number of Pages: 24
Order Number: RL34112
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Peru in Brief: Political and Economic Conditions and Relations with the United States

Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

This report provides an overview of Peru’s government and economy and a discussion of issues in relations between the United States and Peru.

Peru and the United States have a strong and cooperative relationship. Several issues in U.S.-Peru relations are likely to be considered in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Peru. The United States supports the strengthening of Peru’s democratic institutions, its respect for human rights, environmental protection, and counternarcotics efforts. A dominant theme in bilateral relations is the effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, between the two countries. In the economic realm, the United States supports bilateral trade relations and Peru’s further integration into the world economy. The United States is Peru’s top trading partner. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) went into effect February 1, 2009. The Obama Administration requested $74 million in foreign assistance for Peru for FY2013 to advance these objectives.

Ollanta Humala, of the left-wing Gana Peru, was sworn in as Peru’s president in July 2011 for a five-year term. Gana Peru initially won 47 seats out of the 130 seats in the unicameral Congress, requiring Humala to rely on political alliances with lesser parties in order to pass legislation. As Humala has moderated his stance, he has lost left-leaning allies within his and other parties. Deep social divides over how to pursue development continue to undercut political stability. The more radical elements of Humala’s original support base and his party urge the pursuit of more leftist policies, such as nationalization of strategic industries, which Humala called for during the election campaign. Forces that resist more radical policies include a strong business sector; a conservative, wealthy elite; a centrist middle class; and a divided Congress. Social unrest, especially over exploitation of natural resources, remains a challenge for the Humala government. It has established an office of conflict prevention and taken other actions to reduce social conflict.

Since 2001 Peru’s economy has been stronger than all others in the region, with its growth due mostly to the export of natural resources. High economic growth, along with social programs, has helped to lower Peru’s overall poverty rates. Nonetheless, in some jungle, mountain, and rural areas of the country, over 60% of the population continue to live in poverty. The income distribution gap remains quite large as well. This economic disparity has contributed to rising social unrest. President Humala submitted, and the legislature approved, a bill increasing royalties mining companies must pay. The government estimates the royalties will generate about US$1 billion a year, which it will use to finance social development programs intended to narrow both the social divide and the economic distribution gap. .


Date of Report: January 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 16
Order Number: R42523
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Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. The government of Raúl Castro has implemented limited economic policy changes, including an expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. The government has reduced the number of political prisoners over the past several years, but short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly. 

U.S. Policy 

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights activists. In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers called for a reexamination of policy. Two broad approaches have been at the center of debate. The first is to maintain the dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people. The second is aimed at changing attitudes in the Cuban government and society through increased engagement. Since taking office, the Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on family travel and remittances, moved to reengage Cuba on several bilateral issues, and eased restrictions on other types of purposeful travel and remittances. The Administration has criticized Cuba’s repression of dissidents, but has welcomed the release of political prisoners. The Administration has continued to call for the release of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in 2009, and sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 2011. 

Legislative Action 

Strong interest on Cuba continued in the 112th Congress. In the first session, an attempt to roll back the Administration’s easing of restrictions on travel and remittances was unsuccessful. The provision had been included in the House Appropriations Committee version of the FY2012 Financial Services appropriations bill, H.R. 2434, but was not included in the FY2012 “megabus” appropriations measure (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74). Both H.R. 2434 and the Senate version of the bill, S. 1573, also would have continued to clarify the definition of “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2012, but the provision was not included in the “megabus” measure.

In the second session, the Senate approved: S.Res. 366 on February 1, 2012, condemning the Cuban government for the death of democracy activist Wilman Villar Mendoza; S.Res. 525 on July 31, 2012, honoring prominent Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá who was killed in a car accident, and S.Res. 609 on December 5, 2012, calling for the release of Alan Gross. With regard to Cuba democracy funding, the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2013 foreign aid appropriations measure, S. 3241, would have provided $15 million as the Administration requested, while the House Appropriations Committee version of the bill, H.R. 5857, would have provided $20 million. With regard to Cuba broadcasting, S. 3241 would have provided $23.4 million ($194,000 less than the Administration’s request) while H.R. 5857 would have provided $28.062 million ($4.468 million more than the request). The 112th Congress did not complete action on FY2013 appropriations, but it did approve a continuing appropriations resolution in September 2012 (H.J.Res. 117, P.L. 112-175) that continues FY2013 funding through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and activities in FY2012, plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%, although specific country accounts are left to the discretion of responsible agencies. The 113th Congress will need to address appropriations for the balance of FY2013.

Among other initiatives not enacted, two would have increase sanctions: H.R. 2583 would have rolled back the easing of travel and remittance restrictions, and H.R. 2831 would have attempted to curb frequent travel to Cuba by Cubans who have recently immigrated to the United States. Several initiatives would have eased sanctions: H.R. 255 and H.R. 1887 (overall sanctions); H.R. 833 and H.R. 1888 (agricultural exports); and H.R. 380 and H.R. 1886 (travel). Two initiatives, S. 603 and H.R. 1166, would have modified a trademark sanction. Eight bills, H.R. 372, S. 405, H.R. 2047, H.R. 3393, H.R. 4310, H.R. 4135, H.R. 6067, and S. 1836, would have taken different approaches toward Cuba’s offshore oil development. Two bills, S. 476 and H.R. 1317, would have discontinued Radio and TV Martí broadcasts.

This report reflects legislative activity through the 112th Congress and will not be updated.

Date of Report: January 15, 2013
Number of Pages: 100
Order Number: R41617
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Mexico’s New Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in U.S.-Mexican Relations

Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Congress has maintained significant interest in Mexico and played an important role in shaping bilateral relations. Recently, the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that governed Mexico from 1929 to 2000 retook the presidency after 12 years of rule by the conservative National Action Party (PAN) in the July 1, 2012 elections. The party also captured a plurality (but not a majority) in Mexico’s Senate and Chamber of Deputies. PRI President Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, took office on December 1, 2012, pledging to enact bold structural reforms and broaden relations with the United States beyond security issues. U.S. policymakers are closely following what the return of a PRI government portends for Mexico’s domestic policies and relations with the United States.

Upon his inauguration, President Peña Nieto announced a reformist agenda with specific proposals under five broad pillars: reducing violence; combating poverty; boosting economic growth; reforming education; and fostering social responsibility. He then signed a “Pact for Mexico” agreement with the leaders of the PAN and leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) containing legislative proposals for implementing an agenda that includes energy and fiscal reform. Although the pact may ease opposition in Mexico’s Congress, Peña Nieto could face other constraints such as violence perpetrated by Mexico’s powerful criminal organizations and the performance of the U.S. and global economies. Some analysts maintain that the prospects for reform under this administration are good, while others are more circumspect.

U.S.-Mexican relations grew closer during the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012) as a result of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral security effort for which Congress has provided $1.9 billion. Some Members of Congress may be concerned about whether bilateral relations, particularly security cooperation, may suffer now that the party controlling the presidency has changed. Although the transition from PAN to PRI rule is unlikely to result in seismic shifts in bilateral relations, a PRI government may emphasize economic issues more than security matters. President Peña Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a stronger emphasis on reducing violent crime in Mexico than on combating drug trafficking; what that cooperation will look like remains to be seen. He has also expressed support for increased bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic and energy cooperation.

This report, which will be updated, provides an overview of the leadership, priorities, and prospects for Mexico’s new administration. It then briefly analyzes how those priorities may affect key bilateral issues of interest to the 113th Congress and suggests possible questions for oversight related to each issue area. The report concludes with an outlook section containing key questions that may be used to assess the Peña Nieto Administration and its impact on U.S.- Mexican relations.

For more detailed information on Mexico, see: CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea and CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal. For background, see: CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress, by Clare Ribando Seelke.


Date of Report: January 16, 2013
Number of Pages: 21
Order Number: R42917
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