Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component in U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba’s communist government since the early 1960s. Under the George W. Bush Administration, restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic coursework. In June 2004, the Administration further restricted family and educational travel, eliminated the category of fully-hosted travel, and restricted remittances so that they could only be sent to the remitter’s immediate family. Initially there was mixed reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions, but opposition to the policy grew, especially within the Cuban American community regarding the restrictions on family travel and remittances. 

Obama Administration Policy 

Under the Obama Administration, Congress took action in March 2009 by including two provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) that eased restrictions on family travel and travel related to marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. Subsequently, in April 2009, President Obama announced that his Administration would go further and allow unlimited family travel and remittances. Regulations implementing these changes were issued in September 2009. The new regulations also included the authorization of general licenses for travel transactions for telecommunications-related sales and for attendance at professional meetings related to commercial telecommunications.

In January 2011, the Obama Administration announced policy changes further easing restrictions on travel and remittances. The measures (1) increase purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and people-to-people exchanges; (2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities; and (3) permit all U.S. international airports to apply to provide services to licensed charter flights. These new measures, with the exception of the expansion of eligible airports, are similar to policies that were undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1999, but subsequently curtailed by the Bush Administration in 2003-2004. 

Legislative Initiatives 

There were several attempts in the 112th Congress aimed at rolling back the Obama Administration’s actions easing restrictions on travel and remittances, but none of these were approved. Several legislative initiatives were also introduced that would have further eased or lifted such restrictions altogether, but no action was taken on these measures.

To date in the 113th Congress, several initiatives again have been introduced that would lift all travel restrictions: H.R. 871 (Rangel) would lift travel restrictions; H.R. 873 (Rangel) would lift travel restrictions and restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports; and H.R. 214 (Serrano) and H.R. 872 (Rangel) would lift the overall embargo, including travel restrictions.

For further information, see CRS Report R43024, Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.


Date of Report: March 7, 2013
Number of Pages: 42
Order Number: RL31139
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Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress

Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Central America faces significant security challenges. Criminal threats, fragile political and judicial systems, and social hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to widespread insecurity in the region. Consequently, improving security conditions in these countries is a difficult, multifaceted endeavor. Because U.S. drug demand contributes to regional security challenges and the consequences of citizen insecurity in Central America are potentially far-reaching, the United States is collaborating with countries in the region to implement and refine security efforts. 

Criminal Threats 

Well-financed drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), along with transnational gangs and other criminal groups, threaten to overwhelm Central American governments. Counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and Mexico have put pressure on DTOs in those countries, leading many to increase their operations in Central America—a region with fewer resources and weaker institutions with which to combat drug trafficking and related criminality. Increasing flows of narcotics through Central America are contributing to rising levels of violence and the corruption of government officials, both of which are weakening citizens’ support for democracy and the rule of law. DTOs are also increasingly becoming poly-criminal organizations, raising millions of dollars through smuggling, extorting, and sometimes kidnapping migrants. Given the transnational character of criminal organizations and their abilities to exploit ungoverned spaces, some analysts assert that insecurity in Central America poses a potential threat to the United States. 

Social and Political Factors 

Throughout Central America, underlying social conditions and structural weaknesses in governance inhibit efforts to improve security. Persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment leave large portions of the population susceptible to crime. Given the limited opportunities other than emigration available to the expanding youth populations in Central America, young people are particularly vulnerable. At the same time, underfunded security forces and the failure to fully implement post-conflict institutional reforms initiated in several countries in the 1990s have left police, prisons, and judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption. 

Approaches to Central American Security 

Central American governments have attempted to improve security conditions in a variety of ways, and are increasingly experimenting with new policies. Several countries, including Honduras, have taken more of a hardline approach to organized crime, deploying military forces to carry out policing functions. The Guatemalan government has also embraced a larger role for the military in public security, although it has simultaneously called on countries in the region to consider drug decriminalization and other alternatives. Other Central American governments have emphasized prevention activities, such as programs that focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth, while the governments of Belize and El Salvador have supported efforts to broker truces between criminal gangs. Additionally, Central American nations have sought to improve regional security cooperation, recognizing the transnational nature of the threats they face.

U.S. Assistance 

To address growing security concerns, the Obama Administration has sought to develop collaborative partnerships throughout the hemisphere. In Central America, this has taken the form of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which was originally created in FY2008 as part of the Mexico-focused counterdrug and anticrime assistance package known as the Mérida Initiative. CARSI takes a broad approach to the issue of security. In addition to providing the seven nations of Central America with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, CARSI seeks to strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the underlying conditions that contribute to them. From FY2008 to FY2012, Congress appropriated $496.5 million for Central America through Mérida/CARSI. While CARSI funding for FY2013 is currently unclear, the Obama Administration has requested $161.5 million for FY2014. 

Scope of This Report 

This report examines the extent of security problems in Central America, current efforts being undertaken by Central American governments to address them, and U.S. support for Central American efforts through the Central America Regional Security Initiative. It also raises potential policy issues for congressional consideration such as funding levels, human rights concerns, and how CARSI relates to other U.S. government policies.

Date of Report: May 7, 2013
Number of Pages: 42
Order Number: R41731
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Fact Sheet on Leaders and Elections

Barbara Salazar Torreon
Information Research Specialist

This fact sheet tracks the current heads of government in Central and South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. It provides the dates of the last and next elections for the head of government and the national independence date for each country.


Date of Report: April 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 4
Order Number: 98-684
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Latin America: Terrorism Issues

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs

U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. In its 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in July 2012), the State Department maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. It reported that the majority of terrorist attacks in the hemisphere were committed by two Colombian terrorist groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and other radical groups in the Andean region. With regard to Mexico, the report asserted that there was no evidence of ties between Mexican drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups, and no evidence “that these criminal organizations had aims of political or territorial control, aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity with which they conduct their criminal activity.”

Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and potential support for Colombian terrorist groups, although improved Venezuelan-Colombian relations have resulted in closer cooperation on antiterrorism and counter-narcotics efforts and border security.

Over the past several years, policymakers have been concerned about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America. Concerns center on Iran’s attempts to circumvent U.N. and U.S. sanctions, as well as on its ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah. Both Iran and Hezbollah are reported to be linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. As in past years, the State Department 2011 terrorism report maintains that there are no known operational cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah in the hemisphere, but noted that “ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.” 

Legislative Initiatives 

In the 112th Congress, several legislative initiatives were introduced and several oversight hearings were held related to terrorism issues in the Western Hemisphere regarding Mexico, Venezuela, and the activities of Iran and Hezbollah in the region. Most significantly, the 112th Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-220) in December 2012, which requires the Administration within 180 days to conduct an assessment and present “a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” The report may be submitted in classified form, but is to include an unclassified summary of policy recommendations to address the growing Iranian threat in the hemisphere.

The 113th Congress is already continuing its oversight of terrorism concerns in the Western Hemisphere, especially the activities of Iran and Hezbollah. The forthcoming State Department assessment of Iranian activities in the region and a strategy to address them, due to Congress by mid-2013, is likely to be the subject of congressional oversight.


Date of Report: April 5, 2013
Number of Pages: 36
Order Number: RS21049
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