Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human
rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling
Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree
of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a second
five-year term as president (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and
selected 52- year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his
First Vice President, making him the official successor in the event that
Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has implemented a number of
gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including an
expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out
numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter
Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers, however, expect the
government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the
government reduced the number of political prisoners in 2010-2011,
the number increased in 2012; moreover, short-term detentions and
harassment have increased significantly.
U.S. Policy
Over the years, Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward
Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times
easing various U.S. economic sanctions. While U.S. policy has consisted
largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, a second policy
component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including
U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) and support
for human rights and democracy projects. The Obama Administration has
continued this similar dual-track approach. While the Administration has
lifted all restrictions on family travel and remittances, eased restrictions on
other types of purposeful travel, and moved to reengage Cuba on several
bilateral issues, it has also maintained most U.S. economic sanctions in
place. On human rights, the Administration welcomed the release of many
political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, but it has also criticized Cuba’s
continued harsh repression of political dissidents through thousands of shortterm detentions
and targeted violence. The Administration has continued to call for the release
of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in 2009 and
sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 2011.
Legislative Activity
Strong interest in Cuba is continuing in the 113th Congress with attention focused on economic and political
developments, especially the human rights situation, and U.S. policy toward
the island nation, including sanctions. The continued imprisonment of Alan
Gross remains a key concern for many Members. In March 2013, Congress
completed action on full-year FY2013 appropriations with the approval of
H.R. 933 (P.L. 113-6), which continues to provide funding for Cuba
democracy and human rights projects and Cuba broadcasting (Radio and TV
Martí). In July 2013, the Appropriations Committees reported out their
versions of the FY2014 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs appropriations measure. The House version, H.R. 2855 (H.Rept.
113-185), would provide that $20 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)
aid ($5 million more than the Administration’s request) be transferred to the
National Endowment for Democracy “to promote democracy and strengthen
civil society in Cuba.” The Senate version, S. 1372 (S.Rept. 113-81), would
provide that ESF aid appropriated for Cuba only be made available “for
humanitarian assistance and to support the development of private business.”
H.R. 2855 would also provide $28.266 million for Cuba broadcasting (Radio and
TV Martí), while S. 1372 would provide $23.804 million, the same amount as
the Administration’s request. Congress did not complete action on FY2014
appropriations before the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013,
but in mid-October, it did approve the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014
(P.L. 113-46) that continues funding, generally at FY2013 levels, until January
15, 2014. Congress still faces action on appropriations for the balance of
FY2014.
In terms of Cuba sanctions, the House Appropriations Committee-reported version
of the FY2014 Financial Services and General Government appropriations
measure, H.R. 2786 (H.Rept. 113- 172), would prohibit FY2014 funding used
“to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or otherwise allow”
people-to-people travel to Cuba, which the Obama Administration authorized in
2011. In contrast, the Senate Appropriations-reported version of the
measure, S. 1371 (S.Rept. 113-80), would expand the current general
license for professional research and meetings in Cuba to allow U.S.
groups to sponsor and organize conferences in Cuba, but only if specifically
related to disaster prevention, emergency preparedness, and natural
resource protection.
Several other initiatives on Cuba have been introduced in the 113th Congress. Several would
lift or ease U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 214 and H.R. 872
(overall embargo); H.R. 871 (travel); and H.R. 873 (travel and
agricultural exports). H.R. 215 would allow Cubans to play organized
professional baseball in the United States. H.R. 1917 would lift the embargo
and extend nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba after
Cuba releases Alan Gross from prison. Identical initiatives, H.R. 778/S.
647 would modify a 1998 trademark sanction; in contrast, H.R. 214, H.R.
872, H.R. 873, and H.R. 1917 each have a provision that would repeal the
sanction. H.Res. 121 would honor the work of Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez.
H.Res. 262 would call for the immediate extradition or rendering of all
U.S. fugitives from justices in Cuba.
This report will be updated periodically during the 113th Congress. For additional
information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba:
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
Date of Report: October 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 68
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Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious
component in U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba’s communist government since the
early 1960s. Under the George W. Bush Administration, restrictions on
travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003,
the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational
exchanges unrelated to academic coursework. In June 2004, the
Administration further restricted family and educational travel,
eliminated the category of fully-hosted travel, and restricted remittances
so that they could only be sent to the remitter’s immediate family.
Initially there was mixed reaction to the Administration’s June 2004
tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions, but opposition to the
policy grew, especially within the Cuban American community regarding
the restrictions on family travel and remittances.
Obama Administration Policy
Under the Obama Administration, Congress took action in March 2009 by including
two provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8)
that eased restrictions on family travel and travel related to marketing
and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. Subsequently, in April
2009, President Obama announced that his Administration would go further
and allow unlimited family travel and remittances. Regulations implementing
these changes were issued in September 2009. The new regulations also
included the authorization of general licenses for travel transactions for
telecommunications-related sales and for attendance at professional meetings
related to commercial telecommunications.
In January 2011, the Obama Administration announced policy changes further
easing restrictions on travel and remittances. The measures (1) increase
purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and
people-to-people exchanges; (2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances
to non-family members in Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to
send remittances for religious activities; and (3) permit all U.S.
international airports to apply to provide services to licensed charter
flights. These new measures, with the exception of the expansion of eligible
airports, are similar to policies that were undertaken by the
Clinton Administration in 1999, but subsequently curtailed by the Bush
Administration in 2003-2004.
Legislative Initiatives
There were several attempts in the 112th Congress aimed at rolling back the Obama Administration’s actions
easing restrictions on travel and remittances, but none of these
were approved. Several legislative initiatives were also introduced that
would have further eased or lifted such restrictions altogether, but no
action was taken on these measures.
To date in the 113th Congress, the House version of the FY2014 Financial Services and
General Government appropriations measure, H.R. 2786 (H.Rept.
113-172), would prohibit
FY2014 funding used “to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or
otherwise allow” people-to-people travel to Cuba. In contrast, the Senate
version of the measure, S. 1371 (S.Rept.
113-80), would expand the
current general license for professional research and meetings in Cuba to allow
U.S. groups to sponsor and organize conferences in Cuba, but only if
specifically related to disaster prevention, emergency preparedness, and
natural resource protection. Neither of these measures were considered by the
beginning of FY2014 on October 1, 2013. Instead on October 16,
Congress approved a continuing resolution (P.L. 113-46) to fund FY2014
appropriations through January 15, 2014; it still faces action on
appropriations for the balance of FY2014.
As in past Congresses, several legislative initiatives again have been
introduced that would lift all travel restrictions: H.R. 871 (Rangel)
would lift travel restrictions; H.R. 873 (Rangel) would lift travel
restrictions and restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports; and H.R. 214
(Serrano), H.R. 872 (Rangel), and H.R. 1917 would lift the overall
embargo, including travel restrictions.
For further information, see CRS Report R43024, Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues
for the 113th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Date of Report: November 1, 2013
Number of Pages: 45
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Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
While historically the United States has had close relations with Venezuela,
a major oil supplier, friction in bilateral relations rose over the past
decade under the leftist populist government of President Hugo Chávez, who
died in March 2013 after battling cancer for almost two years. First elected
in 1998, Chávez had won reelection to another six-year term in October 2012,
capturing about 55% of the vote compared to 44% for opposition candidate
Henrique Capriles. After Chávez’s death, Venezuela held presidential
elections in April 2013 in which acting President Nicolás Maduro, who had
been serving as Chávez’s vice president, received 50.61% of the vote, compared
to 49.12% for Capriles (a margin of 1.49%). In both of those presidential
elections, the incumbent candidate benefited from the use of state
resources and media for his campaign. The opposition filed challenges to the
2013 election results that were ultimately rejected by Venezuela’s Supreme
Court. Venezuela’s upcoming municipal elections, scheduled for December 8.
2013, will be an important test of strength for the ruling United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable
(MUD). The Maduro government faces significant challenges, including
deteriorating economic conditions and high rates of crime and violence.
U.S. Policy
In recent years, U.S. policy makers and Members of Congress have been concerned
about the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in
Venezuela as well as the Venezuelan government’s lack of bilateral
cooperation on anti-drug and counterterrorism efforts and its relations
with Iran. In September 2013, President Obama issued the ninth annual
determination that Venezuela had “failed demonstrably” to meet its
international counternarcotics obligations. The State Department maintains
that individual members of the Chávez government and security forces were
credibly reported to have engaged in or facilitated drug trafficking
activities. The United States has imposed financial sanctions on eight current
or former Venezuelan officials for allegedly helping the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia with drug and weapons trafficking. The United
States has also imposed sanctions on three Venezuelan companies for support
to Iran and on several Venezuelan individuals for providing support to
Hezbollah. Despite these tensions, the Obama Administration has maintained
that the United States remains committed to seeking constructive
engagement with Venezuela. In June 2013, after a meeting with Venezuelan
Foreign Minister Elías Jaua in Guatemala, Secretary of State John Kerry expressed
hope that the two countries could move quickly to the appointment of
ambassadors, and said that the two countries had agreed to continue
high-level dialogue. Efforts to engage with Venezuela, however, have been
complicated by the Maduro government’s strong rhetoric and actions,
including the offer of asylum to Edward Snowden, accused of leaking U.S.
classified information.
Legislative Initiatives
Over the past decade, developments in Venezuela and U.S. relations with the
country have largely been oversight issues for Congress, with various
hearings held and resolutions approved or introduced in each chamber.
Congress has also appropriated funding over the years for democracy-related
projects in Venezuela through the annual foreign aid appropriations measure. To
date in the 113th Congress, two legislative initiatives have been introduced related to Venezuela:
S.Res. 213 would express support for the free and peaceful exercise of
representative democracy in Venezuela and condemn violence and intimidation
against the country’s political opposition; and H.R. 1687 would, among other
provisions, provide for the imposition of visa and financial sanctions
against certain listed officials of four governments belonging to the Bolivarian Alliance
for the Americas (ALBA)—Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Congress
also faces consideration of the FY2014 foreign aid appropriations measure
(H.R. 2855, S. 1372); the Administration’s request includes $5 million to
support civil society efforts to build and protect democratic freedoms and
protect human rights in Venezuela.
This report, which will be updated periodically, analyzes the political and
economic situation in Venezuela and the country’s foreign policy
orientation. It then examines U.S. relations and policy toward Venezuela
and several key issues that have been at the forefront of congressional
interest: democracy and human rights; energy, including U.S.-Venezuelan
energy linkages; drug trafficking; and terrorism issues, including
Venezuela’s relations with Iran. An appendix provides links to selected
executive branch reports on Venezuela.
For additional information see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, which examines Iran’s relations with Latin America.
Date of Report: September 16, 2013
Number of Pages: 39
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