Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Throughout the last few decades, the United States has maintained a strong interest in El Salvador, a small Central American country with a population of 7.2 million. During the 1980s, El Salvador was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America as its government struggled against the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgency during a 12-year civil war. A peace accord negotiated in 1992 brought the war to an end and formally assimilated the FMLN into the political process as a political party. After the peace accords were signed, U.S. involvement shifted toward helping the government rebuild democracy and implement marketfriendly economic reforms.
Mauricio Funes of the FMLN was inaugurated to a five-year presidential term in June 2009. Funes won a close election in March 2009, marking the first FMLN presidential victory and the first transfer in political power between parties since the end of El Salvador’s civil war. Funes’ victory followed strong showings by the FMLN in the January 2009 municipal and legislative elections, in which the party won a plurality of the seats in the National Assembly and the largest share of the municipal vote.
President Funes still has relatively high approval ratings (69% in November 2010), but faces a number of political, economic, and social challenges. The National Assembly is fragmented, which means that Funes has to form coalitions with other parties in order to advance his legislative agenda. The global financial crisis and U.S. recession negatively impacted El Salvador’s economy, increasing the country’s already widespread poverty. A three-year $790 million agreement signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in March 2010 is helping support economic recovery, but will constrain the Funes’ government’s future fiscal policies. In addition to these political and economic challenges, El Salvador’s violent crime rates remain among the highest in the world and still need to be addressed.
Maintaining close ties with the United States has been a primary foreign policy goal of successive Salvadoran governments. Although some members of Congress expressed reservations about working with an FMLN administration, relations between El Salvador and the United States have remained friendly. After a March 8, 2010, meeting with President Funes at the White House, President Obama said that he was “very favorably impressed by the steps that [Funes is taking] to try to break down political divisions within the country ... focusing on prosperity at every level of Salvadorian society.” Both leaders pledged to continue working together to expand trade through the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), foster development, and combat organized crime. U.S. bilateral assistance, which totaled an estimated $57 million in FY2010, as well as assistance provided through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), is supporting those bilateral goals.
Date of Report: January 3, 2011
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: RS21655
Price: $29.95
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Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. The violent Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18) continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have among the highest homicide rates in the world. In recent years, governments in those countries appeared to move away, at least on a rhetorical level, from repressive anti-gang strategies. However, continuing gang-related violence prompted El Salvador to adopt tough new legislation on gangs in September 2010. Guatemala may follow suit.
U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the expanding presence of the MS-13 and M-18 in cities across the United States, as well as reports that these gangs may be evolving into more sophisticated transnational criminal enterprises. Between February 2005 and October 2010, U.S. officials arrested some 3,332 alleged MS-13 members in cities across the United States, many of whom were subsequently deported. Evidence suggests, however, that previously deported members of both the MS-13 and the M-18 often reenter the United States illegally.
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. An inter-agency committee worked together to develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, first announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American Integration System (SICA) summit on security issues. The strategy, which is now being implemented, states that the U.S. government will pursue coordinated anti-gang activities through five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. federal agencies consider strengthening the aforementioned anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide its implementation.
In recent years, Congress has increased funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress appropriated roughly $21 million in global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central America. In the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress provided $83 million for combating gangs and drug trafficking under a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), splitting Central America from the Mérida Initiative. The Obama Administration asked for $100 million for CARSI in its FY2011 budget request. In the absence of FY2011 appropriations legislation, Congress has passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242 as amended) to fund government programs, with the latest extension set to expire on March 4, 2011. The continuing resolution, as amended, continues funding most foreign aid programs at the FY2010-enacted level, with some exceptions.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. For more information on Central American gangs in the United States, see CRS Report RL34233, The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?, by Celinda Franco.
Date of Report: January 3, 2011
Number of Pages: 24
Order Number: RL34112
Price: $29.95
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Julissa Gomez-Granger
Information Research Specialist
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
This fact sheet tracks the current heads of government in Central and South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. It provides the dates of the last and next elections for the head of government and the national independence date for each country.
Date of Report: January 4, 2011
Number of Pages: 6
Order Number: 98-684
Price: $19.95
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June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
In Mexico, the violence generated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years has been, according to some, unprecedented. In 2006, Mexico’s newly elected President Felipe Calderón launched an aggressive campaign—an initiative that has defined his administration— against the DTOs that has been met with a violent response from the DTOs. Government enforcement efforts have had successes in removing some of the key leaders in all of the seven major DTOs. However, these efforts have led to violent succession struggles within the DTOs themselves. In July 2010, the Mexican government announced that more than 28,000 people had been killed in drug trafficking-related violence since December 2006 when President Calderón came to office.
Although violence has been an inherent feature of the trade in illicit drugs, the character of the drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico seems to have changed recently, now exhibiting increasing brutality. In the first ten months of 2010, an alarming number of Mexican public servants have been killed allegedly by the DTOs, including 12 Mexican mayors and in July, a gubernatorial candidate. The massacres of young people and migrants, the killing and disappearance of Mexican journalists, the use of torture, and the phenomena of car bombs have received wide media coverage and have led some analysts to question if the violence has been transformed into something new, beyond the typical violence that has characterized the trade. For instance, some observers have raised the concern that the Mexican DTOs may be acting more like domestic terrorists. Others maintain that the DTOs are transnational organized crime organizations at times using terrorist tactics. Still others believe the DTOs may be similar to insurgents attempting to infiltrate the Mexican state by penetrating the government and police.
The growing security crisis in Mexico including the March 13, 2010, killing of three individuals connected to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, (two of the victims were U.S. citizens) has drawn the attention of the U.S. Congress and has raised concerns about the stability of a strategic partner and neighbor. Congress is also concerned about the possibility of “spillover” violence along the U.S. border and further inland. The 111th Congress held more than 20 hearings dealing with the violence in Mexico, U.S. foreign assistance, and border security issues. The 112th Congress is likely to be interested in progress made by the Calderón government in quelling the violence and asserting its authority in DTO strongholds, and in the implications for the United States. Members are also likely to continue to conduct close oversight of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and other related bilateral issues.
This report provides background on drug trafficking in Mexico, identifies the major drug trafficking organizations operating today, and analyzes the context, scope, and scale of the violence. It examines current trends of the violence, analyzes prospects for curbing violence in the future, and compares it with violence in Colombia.
For background on U.S. policy responses to the spiraling violence in Mexico and information on bilateral cooperation between the United States and Mexico see: CRS Report R41349, U.S.- Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea. For a discussion of the problem of violence “spilling over” into the United States, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea. For general background on Mexico, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
Date of Report: January 7, 2011
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: R41576
Price: $29.95
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Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component in U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba’s communist government since the early 1960s. Under the George W. Bush Administration, restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic coursework. In June 2004, the Administration further restricted family and educational travel, eliminated the category of fully-hosted travel, and restricted remittances so that they could only be sent to the remitter’s immediate family. Initially there was mixed reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions, but opposition to the policy grew, especially within the Cuban American community regarding the restrictions on family travel and remittances.
Under the Obama Administration, Congress took action in 2009 to ease some restrictions on travel to Cuba by including two provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8), which President Obama signed into law on March 11, 2009. The first provision eased restrictions on family travel, which the Treasury Department implemented by issuing a general license for such travel as it existed prior to the Bush Administration’s tightening of family travel restrictions in 2004. The second provision eased travel restrictions related to the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba, and required the Treasury Department to issue a general license for such travel. Subsequently, in April 2009, President Obama announced that his Administration would go further and allow unlimited family travel and remittances. Regulations implementing these changes were issued in September 2009. The new regulations also included the authorization of general licenses for travel transactions for telecommunications-related sales and for attendance at professional meetings related to commercial telecommunications.
While numerous other legislative initiatives were introduced in the 111th Congress that would have lifted or eased U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba, no action was completed on these measures. The House Agriculture Committee reported out H.R. 4645 (Peterson) in June 2010, a bill that would have lifted all restrictions on travel to Cuba. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs was scheduled to hold a markup of the bill in September 2010, but postponed consideration and no further action was taken. An identical Senate companion bill, S. 3112 (Klobuchar), had been introduced in March 2010. Several other legislative initiatives were introduced in the 111th Congress that would have lifted or eased Cuba travel restrictions: H.R. 874 (Delahunt)/S. 428 (Dorgan) and H.R. 1528 (Rangel) would have prohibited restrictions on travel to Cuba; H.R. 188 (Serrano), H.R. 1530 (Rangel), and H.R. 2272 (Rush), which would have lifted the overall embargo on Cuba, would also have lifted travel restrictions; H.R. 1531 (Rangel)/S. 1089 (Baucus), which would have facilitated the export of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, would also have prohibited Cuba travel restrictions; H.R. 332 (Lee) would have eased restrictions on educational travel; and S. 774 (Dorgan), H.R. 1918 (Flake), and S. 1517 (Murkowski) would have allowed for travel related to hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities. In contrast, H.Con.Res. 132 (Tiahrt) would have call for the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions before the United States increases trade and tourism to Cuba. Interest on the issue of Cuba travel restrictions may continue in the 112th Congress, potentially with legislative initiatives introduced, but in a significantly changed U.S. political environment.
For additional information, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress.
Date of Report: January 7, 2011
Number of Pages: 34
Order Number: RL31139
Price: $29.95
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