Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component in U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba’s communist government since the early 1960s. Under the George W. Bush Administration, restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic coursework. In June 2004, the Administration further restricted family and educational travel, eliminated the category of fully-hosted travel, and restricted remittances so that they could only be sent to the remitter’s immediate family. Initially there was mixed reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions, but opposition to the policy grew, especially within the Cuban American community regarding the restrictions on family travel and remittances. 

Obama Administration Policy 

Under the Obama Administration, Congress took action in March 2009 by including two provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) that eased restrictions on family travel and travel related to marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. Subsequently, in April 2009, President Obama announced that his Administration would go further and allow unlimited family travel and remittances. Regulations implementing these changes were issued in September 2009. The new regulations also included the authorization of general licenses for travel transactions for telecommunications-related sales and for attendance at professional meetings related to commercial telecommunications.

In January 2011, the Obama Administration announced policy changes further easing restrictions on travel and remittances. The measures (1) increase purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and people-to-people exchanges; (2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities; and (3) permit all U.S. international airports to apply to provide services to licensed charter flights. These new measures, with the exception of the expansion of eligible airports, are similar to policies that were undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1999, but subsequently curtailed by the Bush Administration in 2003-2004. 

Legislative Initiatives 

There were several attempts in the 112th Congress aimed at rolling back the Obama Administration’s actions easing restrictions on travel and remittances, but none of these were approved. Several legislative initiatives were also introduced that would have further eased or lifted such restrictions altogether, but no action was taken on these measures.

To date in the 113th Congress, the House version of the FY2014 Financial Services and General Government appropriations measure, H.R. 2786 (H.Rept. 113-172), would prohibit FY2014 funding used “to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or otherwise allow” people-to-people travel to Cuba. In contrast, the Senate version of the measure, S. 1371 (S.Rept. 113-80), would expand the current general license for professional research and meetings in Cuba to allow U.S. groups to sponsor and organize conferences in Cuba, but only if specifically related to disaster prevention, emergency preparedness, and natural resource protection. Neither of these measures were considered by the beginning of FY2014 on October 1, 2013. Instead on October 16,
Congress approved a continuing resolution (P.L. 113-46) to fund FY2014 appropriations through January 15, 2014; it still faces action on appropriations for the balance of FY2014.

As in past Congresses, several legislative initiatives again have been introduced that would lift all travel restrictions: H.R. 871 (Rangel) would lift travel restrictions; H.R. 873 (Rangel) would lift travel restrictions and restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports; and H.R. 214 (Serrano), H.R. 872 (Rangel), and H.R. 1917 would lift the overall embargo, including travel restrictions.

For further information, see CRS Report R43024, Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.


Date of Report: November 1, 2013
Number of Pages: 45
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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

While historically the United States has had close relations with Venezuela, a major oil supplier, friction in bilateral relations rose over the past decade under the leftist populist government of President Hugo Chávez, who died in March 2013 after battling cancer for almost two years. First elected in 1998, Chávez had won reelection to another six-year term in October 2012, capturing about 55% of the vote compared to 44% for opposition candidate Henrique Capriles. After Chávez’s death, Venezuela held presidential elections in April 2013 in which acting President Nicolás Maduro, who had been serving as Chávez’s vice president, received 50.61% of the vote, compared to 49.12% for Capriles (a margin of 1.49%). In both of those presidential elections, the incumbent candidate benefited from the use of state resources and media for his campaign. The opposition filed challenges to the 2013 election results that were ultimately rejected by Venezuela’s Supreme Court. Venezuela’s upcoming municipal elections, scheduled for December 8. 2013, will be an important test of strength for the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD). The Maduro government faces significant challenges, including deteriorating economic conditions and high rates of crime and violence. 

U.S. Policy 

In recent years, U.S. policy makers and Members of Congress have been concerned about the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuela as well as the Venezuelan government’s lack of bilateral cooperation on anti-drug and counterterrorism efforts and its relations with Iran. In September 2013, President Obama issued the ninth annual determination that Venezuela had “failed demonstrably” to meet its international counternarcotics obligations. The State Department maintains that individual members of the Chávez government and security forces were credibly reported to have engaged in or facilitated drug trafficking activities. The United States has imposed financial sanctions on eight current or former Venezuelan officials for allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia with drug and weapons trafficking. The United States has also imposed sanctions on three Venezuelan companies for support to Iran and on several Venezuelan individuals for providing support to Hezbollah. Despite these tensions, the Obama Administration has maintained that the United States remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela. In June 2013, after a meeting with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua in Guatemala, Secretary of State John Kerry expressed hope that the two countries could move quickly to the appointment of ambassadors, and said that the two countries had agreed to continue high-level dialogue. Efforts to engage with Venezuela, however, have been complicated by the Maduro government’s strong rhetoric and actions, including the offer of asylum to Edward Snowden, accused of leaking U.S. classified information. 

Legislative Initiatives 

Over the past decade, developments in Venezuela and U.S. relations with the country have largely been oversight issues for Congress, with various hearings held and resolutions approved or introduced in each chamber. Congress has also appropriated funding over the years for democracy-related projects in Venezuela through the annual foreign aid appropriations measure. To date in the 113th Congress, two legislative initiatives have been introduced related to Venezuela: S.Res. 213 would express support for the free and peaceful exercise of representative democracy in Venezuela and condemn violence and intimidation against the country’s political opposition; and H.R. 1687 would, among other provisions, provide for the imposition of visa and financial sanctions against certain listed officials of four governments belonging to the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA)—Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Congress also faces consideration of the FY2014 foreign aid appropriations measure (H.R. 2855, S. 1372); the Administration’s request includes $5 million to support civil society efforts to build and protect democratic freedoms and protect human rights in Venezuela.

This report, which will be updated periodically, analyzes the political and economic situation in Venezuela and the country’s foreign policy orientation. It then examines U.S. relations and policy toward Venezuela and several key issues that have been at the forefront of congressional interest: democracy and human rights; energy, including U.S.-Venezuelan energy linkages; drug trafficking; and terrorism issues, including Venezuela’s relations with Iran. An appendix provides links to selected executive branch reports on Venezuela.

For additional information see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, which examines Iran’s relations with Latin America.


Date of Report: September 16, 2013
Number of Pages: 39
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Hearing on "A Closer Look at Cuba and its Recent History of Proliferation"

Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation

ChairmanSalmon, Ranking MemberSires, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the recent incident of proliferation from Cuba and the U.N. Sanctions Committee’s response.

The interdiction by Panama on July 10 of the North Korean freighter Chong Chon Gangrevealed ahidden shipment of military goods, ranging from fighter planesto ammunitionthat was on its way to North Korea, according to press reportsand the Cuban government. While we await official reports of what investigators found on the ship, the Cuban government issued a statement on July 16 saying that the weapons being transported on the ship were “two anti-aircraft missiles complexes Volga and Pechora, nine missilesin parts and spares, two MiG21bisand 15 motors for this type of airplane.” According to other reports, the ship was also carrying far more material, including artillery ammunition, light weapons ammunition such as rocket-propelled grenades, and other military items. The ship’stwo previous stopswere Puerto Padre and Havana, Cuba. It is not yet clear whether Cuba had sent the latest weapons shipment to North Korea as a sale, for repair as it claims, or a combination of the two. The sugar which hid the weapons on the Chong Chon Gangmay have been part of a barter arrangement, but it is also possible that payment was made in some other way.


Date of Report: September 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 3
Order Number: T-092613
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